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Abstract 
This work project's main objective is to identify the motivations behind the strategic 
alliance between Harley-Davidson and Porsche. In that sense, this paper includes a case 
study on the specific context of that collaboration and a literature review as the basis of 
its analysis. As a result, the major conclusion was that the drivers of that alliance indeed 
agreed with the general theories on the matter. Factors as venturing on new segments of 
the market or having access to unique resources worked in favor of this partnership, as 
Harley's new engine and motorcycle proved to be a global success. 
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Purpose of Project 
It is the purpose of this project to give the reader a deep insight on the motivations that 
take firms to engage in strategic alliances. It is my objective to extensively explain, 
based on a practical example, the reasons why two companies looked at this type of 
venture as a solution to various business issues. This project will take the form of a case 
study as a way to thoroughly analyze, in this situation, why did Harley-Davidson build a 
partnership with German automobile service provider Porsche for the development of a 
brand new motorcycle engine and in what conditions it happened. This collaboration 
started in the final years of the 20th century and consisted in a major strategic decision 
especially for the Wisconsin-based firm, as it represented a drastic departure from the 
regular methodologies employed since its early ages. 
This work project will be divided into three distinct parts. Firstly, the case description 
will be used to study in detail the whole background of the alliance itself. I will focus on 
the American motorcycle manufacturer's perspective of it, and for that I will rely on the 
contacts made with Dr. Manuel José Olaio, head representative of Harley-Davidson in 
Portugal, apart from other general sources. Yet, Porsche's position will obviously not be 
neglected - my mission is to provide a clear comprehension of this specific strategic 
maneuver, so understanding both sides is important to reach a conclusion. Secondly, I 
will make use of a brief literature review to give the reader a theoretical perspective on 
the topic of strategic alliances and the motives for its formation, which is essential to 
make an extensive analysis of the practical example. Accordingly, this last part will be 
the basis for the third and final chapter, where the case's relevant issues will be applied 
to the theoretical approach to reach a settling conclusion on the matter.  
As a reference, I also provide a separate booklet of appendices with extra information. 
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"The strategic drivers of the 'Revolution'" 
"We fulfill dreams inspired by the many roads of the world by providing remarkable 
motorcycles and extraordinary customer experiences. We fuel the passion for freedom 
in our customers to express their own identity"
1
 - Harley-Davidson's Vision Statement 
 
Jeff Bleustein sat baffled in his office at the end of one more hard working day. The 
recently appointed CEO of Harley-Davidson Inc. knew he had a lot to look forward to, 
as the major American motorcycle manufacturer was facing the turn to a new 
millennium with record breaking sales and the regained worldwide leadership on the 
heavyweight market. However, something had been troubling his mind for quite some 
time. Earlier that week, he had met the Chief Styling Officer Willie G. Davidson in that 
very same office to review the most recent developments of the top-secret P4 Project. 
The conclusions were clear - the projected motorbike would definitely need to be built 
under a completely new framework and design in order to fit the innovative power and 
technology requirements. This, of course, represented a huge risk for a traditionally 
American company that enjoyed one of the strongest brand loyalties in the world. The 
engine, to be developed jointly with Porsche, would indeed represent a drastic departure 
from a centennial legacy, making the new system radically different from any model 
ever built by Harley-Davidson. Besides, how would it successfully capture a new wave 
of customers? And could it effectively fight off the increasing pressure from the most 
important Japanese manufacturers? Jeff knew it was a tough choice - how would he 
make use of a brand new engine, apply an original design to the new motorcycle… and 
still make it look like an  "Harley"?  
                                                          
1
 http://www.harley-davidson.com/en_US/Content/Pages/Company/company.html 
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Harley-Davidson - The conception of an American Legend 
The magnificent story of Harley-Davidson goes back to the very beginning of the 
twentieth century, when William S. Harley and the Davidson brothers completed the 
blueprint design and manufacturing of a bicycle-type engine. It was 1903, and "Serial 
Number One" was already a success - the only three motorcycles that were produced 
would be sold even before they were manufactured. The vehicle (Appendix 1) was 
equipped with a 2 horsepower engine, weighed 180 pounds and its price was $200. 
The focus on high-quality was marketed throughout the next models, as the first two 
decades of the century would mark the rise of Harley-Davidson over hundreds of other 
local motorcycle companies in the United States. An important highlight was the 
adoption of the famous 45 degree "V-Twin" engine, which was first incorporated in 
1909 and became an essential contributor to the brand's global image. A good example 
of this was the model 8XE from 1912, whose dealer bulletin announced "The demand 
for this chain drive twin cylinder, however, is beyond anybody's expectations, even our 
Mr. Harley's, who is very proud of this machine"
2
. A version of this engine is presented 
in Appendix 2, along with a magazine article on one of this model's racing victories. 
The two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century also had a say on the increase 
of the worldwide popularity of Harley-Davidson. It is estimated that over 100,000 
motorcycles were bought by the US Government for both conflicts, which clearly 
reflected the importance of the company in the combat effort. Nevertheless, the 
exponential growth and intensely innovative phase that were the 1910s and 1920s was 
met with near bankruptcy right after the New York Stock Market's crash. Harley 
struggled to survive the serious production cutbacks (which reached as much as 80% of 
                                                          
2 Leffingwell, Randy  and Holmstrom, Darwin (2008) "The Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Archive Collection", pp 32 
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1929's level) and could only slowly recover until World War II. No more than two 
motorcycle manufacturers survived in the US - Harley-Davidson and Indian MMC - 
during the Great Depression, fact that fully reshaped the industry until the mid 50s. 
"It's so easy to enjoy motorcycling, easier than you think to own a genuine Harley-
Davidson. Why not get started now?"
3
 was the message attached to the 1948 Model FL 
which featured the first Panhead engine. Indeed, the time was perfect for this type of 
communication, as the post-war worldwide economic expansion brought new 
international brands and various types of motorcycles into the US. Indian MMC 
disappeared in 1953, yet British and Japanese models were gaining popularity among 
Americans. Riding alone, Harley-Davidson soon faced a serious lack of solutions to 
fight competitiveness, which caused a sweeping downward production trend.  
The complete loss of identity that characterized the brand in the 60s and 70s was much 
due to the company's inability to effectively adapt to market needs. Much effort was 
erroneously done to simultaneously invest on technologically advanced equipment and 
lower production costs, especially after the bankruptcy saving acquisition by American 
Machine & Foundry Company. The sudden rise in sales was followed by the 
identification of several quality issues, which badly tarnished Harley-Davidson's 
reputation. The attempt to benchmark the business model of Japanese firms finally 
proved to be a complete mistake, as these continued to attract more and more customers 
in the market of heavyweight motorcycles.  
The only way out of the rocky road was definitely to focus on quality and 
differentiation, which would return the American manufacturer to its brightest days - at 
least this was the idea that supported the rescue maneuver that would come in 1981.  
                                                          
3
 Leffingwell, Randy  and Holmstrom, Darwin (2008) "The Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Archive Collection", pp 190 
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Ironically enough, the team was composed by 13 Harley-Davidson executives (which 
included Willie G. Davidson and Jeff Bleustein) who swore the intent of investing in the 
personality of the brand, rather than pursuing cost-based strategies.  
Additionally, the early 1980s were also the stage of a thorough investigation on the 
trade practices of the Japanese manufacturers. The US Government ended up imposing 
a 45% tariff on imported motorcycles in 1983, to be dropped gradually over the next 5 
years. With the threat over domestic companies lifted, Harley-Davidson slowly but 
effectively managed to regain its strength thanks to some distinctive operational and 
marketing efforts, such as the adoption of Toyota's Just-In-Time system (to be called 
MAN - Material As Needed) and the creation of the Harley Owners Group (HOG).  
In fact, the prosperous era that were the latest years of the century were deeply 
influenced by the success of the Evolution engine. Firstly incorporated in an original 
conception called Softail, in 1984, the structure was a 1340cc masterpiece that broke the 
records of reliability and performance known until that time (as pictured in Appendix 
3). A proof of that was its immediate integration on several other models, which 
allowed Harley-Davidson to foster its financial vitality. Undeniably, the Milwaukee-
based firm was rapidly recovering from its slump to re-conquer the market. 
  
The Modern Harley 
As mentioned, the last two decades of the 20th century saw Harley-Davidson rise from 
the ashes. The outstanding financial results - which consisted on record breaking sales 
and units every year since 1986 - seemed to slingshot the company into a very 
promising 21st century, contrarily to the rollercoaster ride that was its predecessor. But 
more important than numbers was the immense customer loyalty that was felt towards 
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the brand, perhaps more than any other company in the entire world, and that definitely 
encouraged managers to take a leap into the new era. Two of the major aspects that 
contributed to this hype and excitement were the growing popularity of the "chopper" 
concept (customization of motorcycles) and the success of Harley's own racing team.  
So, in 1995, the American Legend was well assured the worst had passed as they 
forecasted the next few years sales and results. The motorbikes were selling way faster 
than they were produced, which often meant long waiting lines to get one. However, 
due to the rapidly changing market environment, some facts still required refinements - 
there was indeed much enthusiasm around the continuous development of high-quality 
motorcycles, a "burden" created by Harley's own legacy. 
Firstly, the increasingly more restrictive air and noise pollution regulations required the 
company to be more preventive in the engine improvement segment. That meant that 
some of the current models would have to undergo serious re-manufacturing to comply 
with these rigid legislations in the future. Secondly, the threat of market saturation was 
obvious for every brand in the industry. In its case, Harley-Davidson was facing a 
predictable rise in the median age of its owners, making new solutions necessary to 
dilute the risk of decreasing sales and profits. And thirdly (and probably most 
importantly), the American brand was dealing with very tight competition, mainly from 
Japanese manufacturers. Despite the record-breaking sales every year, the market share 
felt very little variations in the three main markets, which implied that other companies 
experienced a similar growth. More interestingly, while Honda, Suzuki and Yamaha 
were able to compete fiercely worldwide (each with a 10-20% slice in the three 
regions), Harley was finding it extremely hard to capture value in Europe.  
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Still, the 90s saw the "Eagle" leading the worldwide heavyweight motorcycle industry, 
mainly due to the outstanding performance in the United States. Refer to Exhibit 1 and 
Exhibit 2 in the final page of this case-study for Harley-Davidson's market data. 
 
The next move: the "P4" Project 
It was under the previously stated conditions that Harley-Davidson launched a top-
secret maneuver to engage the development of a breakthrough motorcycle, in mid-1995. 
The P4 Project was meant to create an appealing model for a new wave of customers, 
more attracted to power, efficiency and sophistication. In fact, the plan was to introduce 
several new elements that were never seen in any previous model. Nevertheless, despite 
all the innovations, the need to have that "Harley look" required a well thought 
balancing act, reason why Willie G. Davidson was called as project manager. 
The founding family descendant soon prepared some important conclusions. Firstly, the 
creation of a powerful model would only be possible with a liquid-cooled engine, 
contrarily to the air-cooled ones that were built for the regular motorcycles. And 
secondly, to support such an engine, the whole structure would need to sustain much 
more speed, thus requiring a different and more complex configuration. Quickly, the 
team turned its eyes to the only area where Harley had produced performance-based 
vehicles: the racing team. One specific model, the 1994 VR-1000, fixed attentions for 
its 160 horsepower, water-cooled and 60-degree V-twin engine and its lightweight 
structure (as pictured in Appendix 4), making the path to follow somewhat clear. 
However, it was easier said than done. The racing engine was developed to last only for 
competition weekends and, given the circumstances, did not obviously comply with 
noise and air pollution regulations. Besides, the need to develop such improvements 
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required much skills and knowledge on liquid-cooled engines, something that Harley-
Davidson did not have at the time. After much deliberation, the CEO Jeff Bleustein 
came to the conclusion that the answer to the American manufacturer's problems was 
called Porsche. This choice was not only based on the previously established connection 
between the two companies (as discussed over the next chapters), but also on the 
German car producer's knowledge and skills on engine development, an area where it 
had built a service team that explored this set of competences for other firms.   
 
A solution from the other side of the world 
Ferdinand Porsche created the famous German company on his own name in Stuttgart, 
by 1931. Its core business strategy, from the very beginning, consisted mainly on the 
development of engines and engineering consultancy services rather than the production 
of original vehicles. In fact, it was not until 1939 that the first car under the engineer's 
name, the Porsche 64, was built, taking most components from the Volkswagen Beetle 
(of which he was the main designer and developer). From that time on, the firm started 
manufacturing unique high-quality sports cars while still operating independently with 
the development services unit. Its most famous models, such as the 911 or the 928, were 
widely popular especially in Europe, which made the firm be ranked as one of the most 
prestigious automobile manufacturers in the world. Similarly to Harley-Davidson, 
Porsche also had a quite successful racing squadron contributing to its reputation. 
The engineering services were, as said, the responsibility of an autonomous team inside 
Porsche. With its own development center in Weissach since 1961, this division worked 
out its expertise through many different areas and for many different companies. 
Accordingly, the reputation of this department was built through time, as the potential 
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skills gained from each assignment were a key part of Porsche's strategy. The group's 
portfolio included projects not only for other car manufacturers as Mercedes or Audi, 
but also for airplane producer Airbus or for the McLaren Formula 1 team, which show 
the focus on diversity that the German company tried to foster. As a result, the superior 
competence and experience shown in its ventures made the engineering services play a 
significant part in Porsche's performance and financial results from the start. A 
summary of the business of this division is represented in Appendix 5. 
  
The experience with Porsche 
The collaboration for the P4 Project was not the first time that Harley-Davidson 
contacted Porsche, as mentioned before. In the mid-1970s, the troubled period that was 
the AMF management control took Harley to intially pursue two different strategies at 
the same time. In one hand was the continuous improvement of the regular V-twin 
models, an update that would turn out to become the Evolution engine. In the other 
hand, the American company initiated a program similar to the P4 and for the same 
reasons: the development of a breakthrough, powerful motorcycle to capture a different 
set of customers from the market. 
The plan included the creation of a brand new engine, nothing like Harley riders had 
ever seen before. For its development, H-D counted on Porsche's engineering services 
expertise, since the option fell again on a liquid-cooled engine. The result was a high-
tech masterpiece called "Nova", with four cylinders instead of two, and 135 horsepower 
- indeed, a drastic departure from the regular models. However, the doubts regarding the 
motorcycle's styling and design after incorporating the engine only led to more delays 
and expenses. As the risk was too high for the financial situation of the company, the 
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project was dropped out in favor of the Evolution path, representing the loss of several 
million dollars worth of investments. Only a few mock-ups were built based on the 
work that had been done so far, as the one depicted in Appendix 6. 
 
The motivations behind the new approach 
As explained, the partnership between Harley-Davidson and Porsche for the P4 Project 
did not come out of nowhere and was not that unpredictable as most riders might have 
thought. The two companies focused on high-quality methods, which provided a very 
efficient alignment of interests and a solid basis of communication for the difficult task 
ahead. But more importantly, this strategic alliance could prove to be a solution to a 
number of issues the American manufacturer was facing. 
First and foremost, Harley would have access to the most advanced technology on 
engine development, which would perfectly fit the needs of the project. Porsche had a 
lot of experience with the design of powerful liquid-cooled engines for its cars and the 
knowledge gathered on such ventures could ensure that the P4 would meet a fortunate 
end. The fact that the German manufacturer had a very strong global representation also 
worked in favor of the reputation of the developed engine, as the engineering team had 
close contact with top, demanding clients. The alliance would solve the issues coming 
from the clear lack of skills of the American mechanics on such different structures. 
Secondly, associating with a German brand would empower Harley-Davidson to 
penetrate the market where it performed the poorest: Europe. Most of the reputation of 
Porsche was built around "the old continent" for the obvious geographic proximity, 
which meant that many countries and local markets could actually have very positive 
reactions towards the new model and engine. Moreover, it could also work favorably to 
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enhance the position in the Asian market, where customers were more devoted to 
power, speed and technological innovations when compared, for example, to American 
customers. Also related to this last possibility was the way the partnership could 
promote the creation of entry barriers for other custom motorcycle manufacturers 
looking to diversify its offerings in the future. Another important idea to retain is the act 
of defense towards the fierce competition of Japanese brands, whose strategy based on 
efficient and cheaper vehicles seemed not willing to concede the tiniest bit of market 
space. A Harley based on the projected engine could set the differentiation focus one 
step ahead and effectively counter-attack Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki's maneuvers. 
Last but not least, risk diversification was also taken into account before formalizing the 
collaboration between the two entities. Given the inherent uncertainties and the amount 
of investments and employed resources on the project, it was vital for Harley-Davidson 
to also protect itself from an undeniably risky venture. Holding the two companies 
accountable and responsible for their actions was part of that effort. 
From Porsche's perspective, the strategic alliance could also prove to be worth the effort 
if we look at the potential increase of reputation in North America. Indeed, the 
partnership could definitely enhance the German automobile manufacturer's position in 
the United States, where European sports cars felt weakened by the extremely strong 
presence of American muscle brands as Dodge, Chevrolet, Ford or Pontiac.  
However, the most significant motivation probably resided on the ability to gain unique 
competences. Indeed, the joint operations would also increase the expertise of Porsche's 
engineering team through shared knowledge, adding up for the experience gained 
through time for the most distinct industries. The importance given to the contract 
development division makes this type of projects essential to ensure that the most 
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demanding customers in the future are addressed with top-quality services and ensures 
the differentiation of the German company in this field. In this case, the learning of new 
methods could actively contribute to enhance the capabilities of the engineers employed 
at Harley-Davidson, working in favor of their preparation and cutting edge skills. 
Moreover, these gained unique competences could also open the doors for more 
businesses in the motorcycling industry. That is, as the engineering team would then be 
able to effectively supply a new market segment, other companies in the same area 
could approach Porsche for collaboration in new projects, creating important 
opportunities for value creation.   
Concluding, the capability of capturing a wider branch of customers from the market 
probably spoke louder than any other reason for Harley-Davidson. The fact that more 
riders could have a contact with the company meant more exposure to the brand and its 
customer experience, which could result in an outstanding entry door for such power-
driven customers. Once they bought the first vehicle, the clients would have the ability 
to diversify and buy other Harley motorcycles, resulting in a long-term positive effect 
for the American manufacturer. Also, the fact that H-D could ensure very promising 
benefits for Porsche contributed to the sustainability of the alliance, as both sides were 
motivated on making it work.  
 
The effects on the P4 
Much was still left to do after the partnership was agreed upon. The team was prepared 
for more hard work, and its expectations were not defrauded - the incorporation of the 
new engine required more unique parts to support its technicalities. As time passed by, 
more and more ideas and innovations were tested for design and styling purposes in the 
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first place, before eventually being experienced on the road. In the details resided the 
most exhaustive part of the job, but also the most interesting, as Willie G. Davidson 
often stated. However, the P4 was taking way more time and expenses than expected, 
and the confidence in the joint operations of the engineering and styling groups was 
obviously weakening. Nevertheless, tenacity played a key role. 
Indeed, the love-hate relationship between engineers and stylists proved to be worth the 
duration of the project, as it brought many original ideas to the table. The new 
motorcycle (as compared with a "traditional" one in Appendix 8) would be the first ever 
to have hydroformed aluminum for the framework around the engine and for the new 
exhaust pipes, in order to respect the recent noise regulations. The method involved 
shaping the material according to the desired form using water pressure, creating lighter 
and more rigid unibody structures in a very cost-effective way. Another breakthrough 
innovation was the gas tank: due to the rail system, it was positioned in the lower part of 
the seat instead of the front, and was made out of plastic instead of metal, for its 
weightlessness and flexibility. Finally, there was also the need to build a unique 
radiator, since the excessive power of the new engine required an extra effort to remain 
at acceptable temperatures. This new item was the one that probably required the most 
testing and was placed right behind the front wheel. 
The engine coming from the Harley-Davidson - Porsche alliance was called 
"Revolution", for evident reasons, and its differences from other major engines are 
represented in Appendix 8. The structure featured liquid refrigeration, dual overhead-
cams, four valves per cylinder and a 60 degree V-twin geometry. With a capacity of 
1130 cc and 115 horsepower, this potent machine allowed any rider to reach a pace of 
140 mph and included all the conditions to please the most skeptical speed-aficionado. 
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The final unveiling 
After several months of extreme testing, the 6-year old P4 Project reached its end. That 
meant dozens of days worth several thousand-mile rides, overheat and water-jet 
exposure or radiation bombardment sessions - the regular quality assurance methods for 
the modern Harleys. Countless dealers from around the world were also invited to travel 
to the American facilities to test the new motorcycle for any defects and were free to 
make any suggestion. The most modern, advanced and sophisticated vehicle ever 
produced by the American legend was finally concluded.  
The sunny Las Vegas finally welcomed the yearly Harley-Davidson convention in June 
of 2001, which would be the debut event of the "V-Rod", as the motorcycle was 
baptized. Jeff Bleustein and Willie G. Davidson could not hold their joy as the new 
"baby" was unveiled on the stage. It definitely was a long and winding road, but the 
creation was simply amazing and paid off the long waiting period. 
Still, much doubts regarding the reception of the V-Rod kept storming both men's 
minds. The amount of innovations on the vehicle made it look evidently different from 
any other ever made - in fact, its relatively lower distance from the ground made it 
resemble a "dragster", a powerful low-rider performance motorcycle used for special 
competitions. Given the incredible loyalty around the brand, there was the serious 
possibility that riders would not look at it as a Harley, which could make it a huge flop 
in the industry. Nevertheless, the team showed great confidence on the success of the V-
Rod and on the strategic alliance with Porsche for the continuation of the Revolution 
engine. Only the future would tell whether the path towards power was a wise one for 
Harley-Davidson. 
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Case Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle units sold and revenue sheet (1986-1995) 
Source: Harley-Davidson Fact Book (2012) - investor.harley-davidson.com 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Units Sold 36 735 43 315 50 517 58 925 62 458 
Revenue 
(thousands) 
$295 322 $342 389 $405 391 $517 006 $624 027 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Units Sold 68 626 76 495 81 696 95 811 105 104 
Revenue 
(thousands) 
$701 969 $822 929 $933 262 $1 158 887 $1 350 466 
 
Exhibit 2 
Harley-Davidson's market share on the heavyweight motorcycle industry on the three 
main markets (Europe, North America, Japan & Australia), from 1991 to 1995 
Source: Harley-Davidson Fact Book (2012) - investor.harley-davidson.com 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Europe 5,6% 5,7% 6,1% 7,1% 7,2% 
North America 47,9% 50,1% 47,7% 46,4% 47,7% 
Japan & Australia 19,5% 16,1% 18,7% 19,4% 20,1% 
ACCUMULATED 20,0% 20,5% 21,5% 23,4% 23,5% 
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Literature Review 
Prior to understanding the logic behind strategic alliances, it is important to identify and 
describe its concept. Michael Yoshino defines a strategic alliance as "a trading 
partnership that enhances the effectiveness of the competitive strategies of the 
participating firms by providing for the mutually beneficial trade of technologies, skills, 
or products based upon them" (1995:4). Additionally, the same author enounces three 
necessary conditions on which it may happen: "The two or more firms that unite to 
pursue a set of agreed upon goals remain independent subsequent to the formation of 
the alliance; the partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control over the 
performance of assigned tasks (…); the partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in 
one or more key strategic areas, e.g., technology, products, and so forth" (1995:5). This 
generic notion gives emphasis to the fact that companies may see this type of agreement 
as a way to achieve a competitive position that otherwise would be difficult to attain. 
Moreover, it implies an underlying willingness of the involved entities to share or 
"trade" specific resources in order to accomplish common goals.  
For the purpose of this project, it is imperative to comprehend what takes two (or more) 
companies to engage in a relationship like this. Specifically, it seems vital to study the 
real drivers of strategic alliances - the motives that make organizations consider a 
collaboration on their approach to the market. In this chapter, I will first focus on the 
most important reasons for alliance formation and then provide a simplistic framework 
to analyze and understand these reasons more thoroughly. 
Firstly, I would like to start with the importance of improving the company's own 
position based on the attractiveness of the market and the intensity of the competition 
(Kogut, 1988; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995). This can happen either by 
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differentiation or defensive strategies. Factors as gaining access to international markets 
or improving the competitiveness in present markets can be seen as potential 
motivations for firms to engage in such partnerships. Through an alliance, a company 
may have the ability to take advantage of an associating firm's already established 
structure (such as the distribution network, brand reputation or market knowledge) and 
unique product specifications instead of having to create or develop them from scratch 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995). Additionally, firms can raise barriers to new 
companies and diminish the threat of future competition by collaborating for technology 
licensing (or patent research), by improving the technology standards of the industry or 
by "denying competitors the base volume necessary to exploit economies of scale" 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995: 286). Finally, firms can also face the possibility 
of enjoying growth opportunities in other segments or domains or the market using the 
outcomes of this strategy.  
Another important driver of strategic alliances is the way firms can exploit the access to 
unique resources and capabilities (Mowery et al., 1996; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 
1995; Whipple and Gentry, 2000). Mowery et al. (1996) refer to the uncertainty behind 
certain resource characteristics to explain why companies often rely on alliances rather 
than simpler contracts to reach, attain and monitor the use of the partner's "tacit 
knowledge". Indeed, firms often lack the appropriate skills and competences to serve 
new markets and find these partnerships attractive for the possibility to capture the ally's 
sophisticated technology (Whipple and Gentry, 2000). This, in turn, can add solutions to 
the product/service line of both companies, which can individually work as a motivation 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995). Additionally, firms can engage in the process of 
learning from collaborations for the same reason. The improvement of the firms' 
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competences in a certain area of expertise can sometimes be achieved easily through 
strategic alliances when both companies are willing to study and learn from each other's 
methods. 
This resource exploitation by the engaging companies can also have other 
consequences, such as lowering manufacturing or transaction costs. The first is 
intrinsically related to the way a firm makes use of specific partner's resources 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995) - access to economies of scale, supply-chain 
assets or even joint planning can lead to an efficient use of inventories, for instance, 
which can lower costs. The second is more linked to the concept of "transaction cost 
economies", as extensively studied by Kogut (1988). The basic idea is that expenses 
coming specifically from transaction processes - negotiations, opportunistic behavior on 
incomplete contracts or the enforcement of those contracts - can be reduced when the 
two companies that induce them are strategically aligned. That is, the two companies 
feel the need to establish a clear comprehension of their business together.  
Lastly, the ability to manage the risk through cooperation can also be considered an 
important driver of these kind of ventures (Mowery et al., 1996). When capital 
requirements are extremely high for certain development projects, firms tend to be 
encouraged to protect their own position by reducing the exposure to the risk of such a 
maneuver. Hence, an alliance offers an opportunity for the company to more efficiently 
control the existent threats, as the partner organization normally shares some of the risk 
of the project. This can happen, for example, through cost spreading agreements or 
through facility sharing, as the firms may prefer not to face the totality of expenditures 
that would inevitably happen if the alliance was not an option (Varadarajan and 
Cunningham, 1995). 
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From the knowledge gained with this review, I believe a straightforward framework 
would be to divide the motivations among 3 groups (Market, Resources & Technology 
and Risk Management), as shown in the next table. These motives will be used as a 
basis of application of the case's features in the next section. 
Market-related motives: 
Access to new markets; 
Enhance/defend competitive position in the market; 
Reduce threat of future competition; 
Increase barriers to entrant firms;  
Enter new product/service domains; 
Resources & Technology-related motives: 
Learn new skills from collaboration; 
Access to new, more advanced technology; 
Access to unique knowledge or product/service expertise;  
Add solutions to the current product/service line;  
Lower manufacturing, marketing or transaction costs; 
Risk management-related motives: 
Protect own position from high uncertainty exposure: 
 - Spread costs/capital investments (R&D, equipment,…); 
 - Share facilities; 
 
The most important notion to retain is that these partnerships are a way by which firms 
can achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace, as organizations must feel the 
need to look at them as a source of sustained benefits and growth (Dyer et al., 2001). 
This, in turn, gives vital significance to studying what managers use alliances for - their 
drivers - and how it actually enhances the companies' competitive position. As Yoshino 
puts it, "the lesson of alliances is simple: they are a new way to compete in the 
international marketplace" (1995:68).  
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Conclusion - Application of Literature 
It seems clear to conclude that the context of the case definitely falls in line with what 
most general theoretical perspectives state on the topic of strategic alliances and their 
motivations. Accordingly, it appears legitimate and obvious to say that both Harley-
Davidson and Porsche were looking at the partnership as a means to achieve (or sustain) 
a competitive advantage in their respective industries, yet their motives to do so were 
understandably different. However, and even though the companies' businesses are 
apart from each other, it is possible to identify some commonalities on their individual 
objectives and expected returns from the alliance itself. After all, the possibility to 
capture value from the collaboration was definitely real, at least if we look at the 
experience Harley and Porsche already had together. 
From the American motorcycle manufacturer's perspective, one of the opportunities the 
alliance offered was taking advantage of Porsche's worldwide brand reputation to 
approach a wider set of customers. In this sense, accessing new markets and enhancing 
its own competitive position rang as very good motivations for Harley-Davidson. The 
German company's focus on high-quality products and services was globally recognized 
and distinctively associated with the brand, especially in Europe - the market where H-
D still faced more difficulties. Additionally, Harley could also benefit from Porsche's 
deeper knowledge and expertise with high-end clients, which would be vital for the 
success of the new motorcycle. Moreover, even if a defensive strategy was not the main 
objective here, the fact that the product would be an exceptionally refined and 
sophisticated engine meant that the technology standards of the industry could be 
altered, at least for this sector. Therefore, the partnership could erode the position of 
competing firms by demanding a differentiated response in the future. 
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Furthermore, the idea of having access to unique technology and resources was also 
present in Harley's managers' minds. Indeed, Porsche had gained major experience on 
the area of liquid-cooled engines, and the American manufacturer would take advantage 
from the knowledge and skills of the team of engineers coming from Stuttgart. This, in 
turn, would create the possibility for Harley-Davidson to improve its product line. The 
projected high-tech motorcycle would definitely fill a gap in the company's solutions, as 
the manufactured vehicles until that time were not nearly as efficient and performance-
driven as the V-Rod would actually be. It was certainly something Harley owners had 
never seen before, which would, as said before, make the company enter new market 
domains by attracting a different set of customers. 
Likewise, Porsche regarded the strategic relationship as an efficient way to differentiate 
its status. However, more than a reason to better explore the US market, the car makers 
looked at the partnership with Harley-Davidson as a way to develop their own skills in 
an industry where they did not have that much contact. Having had projects for 
automobile brands, racing teams or airplane manufacturers, a chance to work with a 
motorcycle legend presented an amazing opportunity to improve the engineering 
services skills. 
Accordingly, by having access to the unique methods of the Wisconsin-based firm, 
Porsche could capitalize its efforts and improve its capabilities. Learning was 
perceptibly part of the equation, as it was the engineering team's job not only to offer 
their own knowledge on engine development (specifically liquid-cooled structures as 
the Revolution) but also to align its own technique with the American stylists' tasks. 
This meant understanding and adapting to a different work methodology, which worked 
in favor of enhancing the experience of this particular Porsche division. 
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Also, this qualified expertise was part of the German company's vision - "Our customers 
place their trust in our diverse specialist competences"
4
. Therefore, it is clear that it was 
essential for Porsche to develop capabilities in many fields, as the case of the heavy 
motorcycle industry. Adding solutions to its service line and entering a new service 
domain worked as motivations in that sense, as this could be a point of entrance to other 
projects in that same industry, too.    
Nevertheless, it is also important to consider the risk in such partnerships. In this case, 
both companies may have looked at the alliance as a way to diversify the exposure to 
any possible hazard coming from the project. If, for example, Harley-Davidson decided 
to do it alone, it would have to bear much more expenses (i.e. R&D, staff, infra-
structures), which could leave fewer room for maneuvering the new engine 
development phase. 
As a final note, it is essential to say that both parts' reasons to engage in the strategic 
alliance were vital to make it work, as Harley-Davidson and Porsche were motivated to 
reach a common goal and still make it beneficial for the two. The V-Rod ended up 
being the most awarded motorcycle in H-D's centennial history, winning prizes in areas 
such as performance and design. But most significantly, it is important to state that the 
partnership is still functioning today. Indeed, as the final outcome of the P4 project 
proved to be a worldwide success, the Revolution engine was further enhanced and is 
still included in several newly built models by 2013. Additionally, the American 
manufacturer managed to strengthen its position in the market, reaching a level of 
worldwide market share for the heavyweight segment between 30 and 40 percent (2001-
2012)
5
.         
                                                          
4
 http://www.porscheengineering.com/peg/en/about/about-what/ 
5 Harley-Davidson Fact Book (2012) - investor.harley-davidson.com 
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